Strategic investment decisions under the nuclear power debate in Belgium [WP] by Frutos Cachorro, Julia de et al.
 




Strategic investment decisions under the 










UB Economics Working Papers 2018/383 
 
Strategic investment decisions under the nuclear 
power debate in Belgium    
 
 
Abstract: In view of the current nuclear power debate in Belgium, we analyze how 
uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out, coupled with the implementation of renewable 
energy subsidies and nuclear taxes, affects investment capacity and productivity 
decisions by Belgian electricity suppliers. To achieve this goal, considering the key 
characteristics of the Belgian market, we build a Stackelberg closed-loop (two-stage) 
equilibrium model in which investment decisions are made in a first stage under 
uncertainty regarding a nuclear phase-out, and productivity decisions are subsequently 
made in a second stage in a certainty environment. Our analysis indicates that, 
regardless of subsidies, an increase in the probability of nuclear license extension 
results in lower levels of investment - primarily in renewable energy -, lower total 
production and a higher electricity price. We also show that the implementation of 
renewable energy subsidies reduces the effect of an increase in probability of nuclear 
license extension on producer’s decisions regarding expanded capacity and on total 
profits in the market. 
 
 
JEL Codes:  C72, L10, L94, Q40, Q48. 
 
Keywords: Electricity market, capacity investment decisions, stackelberg-based 
model, closed-loop, uncertainty nuclear production, renewable energy subsidies. 
 
Julia de Frutos Cachorro 
Universitat de Barcelona 
  
Gwen Willeghems 
VITO - EnergyVille 
 
Jeroen Buysse 





Acknowledgements: This work has been funded by Belgian Science Policy Office Belspo, in 
the framework of the Belgian research action through interdisciplinary networks BRAIN-be, 







The Belgian electricity market is characterized by high dependence on nuclear energy and a dominant 
market position by one of the market players that operates all the nuclear plants in Belgium. Since 2003, the 
Belgian government seems committed to a nuclear phase-out. However, recently, the government extended 
the operational license permits of the three oldest nuclear power plant units from 2015 to 2025 because of a 
highly likely shortage of electricity supply. In view of this uncertainty regarding a nuclear phase-out and 
the EU's Renewable Energy Directive, ensuring security of supply and a stable investment climate has 
become an important challenge for decision makers. The goal of this study is to analyze how uncertainty 
about a nuclear phase-out, coupled with the implementation of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear 
taxes, affects the investment capacity and productivity decisions of electricity suppliers in Belgium.  
In this context, a number of studies have already been conducted on the future of Belgian power generation 
and the optimal electricity mix (see Albrecht and Laleman (2014), Van Wortswinkel and Lodewijks (2012)).  
Van Wortswinkel and Lodewijks (2012) applied the Belgian TIMES model, which is a techno-economic, 
partial equilibrium model of the energy system, to the case of the Belgian region of Flanders, with the 
purpose of supporting the model user in their decision-making on cost-optimal energy. Through a model 
similar to the PRIMES1 model, Albrecht and Laleman (2014) investigated policy trade-offs for the Belgian 
electricity system and concluded that (i) market participation by renewables is essential for an affordable 
and sustainable energy mix in the future, (ii) a higher share of renewables will result in higher overall system 
costs in future decades, and (iii) the feedstock costs of biomass will be the main driver in the overall costs 
of any energy mix involving a high share of renewable energy (RE) technologies.  
Indeed, most of the economic literature about electricity market structure and production decisions is based 
on partial and general equilibrium models (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014; Van Wortswinkel and Lodewijks, 
2012),  in which the main model assumption is that individual suppliers of the electricity market assume 
                                                            
1 The PRIMES energy model simulates the European energy system through a multi-market equilibrium solution for 
energy supply and demand (Capros, 1998). 
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perfect competition; that is, they consider that no single firm can influence the market price. However, in 
reality, proper market models must deal with imperfectly competitive markets (see Ventosa et al., 2005 for 
a review), that is, suppliers can take a strategic position to influence the market price and, thereby, the total 
electricity generation capacity in the market. As explained above, the Belgian electricity market is 
characterized by a dominant firm that accounts with the 60% of the installed capacity, including all nuclear 
plants. Thus, we could assume that only the dominant firm has market power. In order to take into account 
this fact within the modelling, we have developed an stackelberg-based model in which there is one leader 
firm, who is the first to take decisions, and one follower, who chooses subsequently. Both leader and 
follower compete in quantities.To the best of our knowledge, this equilibrium concept has not so far been 
introduced in the current models of electricity mix forecast for the Belgian case.  
Moreover, as described in the first paragraph, we consider important characteristics of the Belgian context, 
such as policy uncertainty regarding nuclear phase-out. Indeed, the vast majority of the previous papers 
considers uncertainty on demand and prices, as the main sources of uncertainty on electricity markets, while 
policy uncertainty is often neglected. Centeno et al. (2003) pointed out the difficulties of accounting for 
uncertainty in large scale problems. In this paper, we focus on the uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out and 
how this uncertainty influences new investments in clean technologies in the Belgian market. In particular, 
production and additional investment capacity strategies in equilibrium are analyzed in a two-stage closed-
loop model. In fact, closed-loop models are more suitable to represent the real decision process in the 
electricity market, as argued by Wogrin et al. (2013). In our study, in a first stage, firms decide about their 
investment capacity decisions under different probabilities of nuclear license extension, and, subsequently, 
in a second stage, firms decide about their yearly production hours, in an environment with certainty about 
their current installed capacities, i.e., taking into account the results of the first stage. We show that lower 
production amounts and higher prices are reached in a certainty environment in which the extension of 
nuclear permits is guaranteed as compared to the case of a definitive nuclear phase-out. Moreover, new 
investments in renewables increase when the probability of nuclear license extension decreases, reaching 
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the maximum levels in case of certainty about a nuclear phase-out. Finally, we analyze these previous 
results, with and without considering the implementation of renewable subsidies and nuclear taxes. We 
show that the presence of renewable energy subsidies plays a fundamental role in the overall entirety of 
electricity mix and strategic positioning of electricity producers. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the Belgian context, including the 
specific nuclear policy framework, as well as power market characteristics and related literature. In Section 
3, we describe the model, followed by an explanation of model parameters and assumptions in Section 4. 
Model results are presented in Section 5, and, finally, the paper is concluded and discussed in Section 6.  
2. The Belgian context: Nuclear policy framework,  power market characteristics 
and related literature 
2.1. Legislative framework about nuclear phase out 
Belgium currently has seven nuclear reactors, the first of which became operational in 1974. Engie 
Electrabel operates all seven nuclear units and owns three of the units outright, as well as 89.8% of another 
three (the remaining 10.2% are owned by EDF Luminus). Electrabel jointly owns the remaining unit with 
France's EDF.   
On 31 January 2003, the Belgian Senate approved the Federal Act which prohibited the building of new 
nuclear power plants and limited the operating lives of existing ones to 40 years, effectively shutting down 
30% of the country’s nuclear capacity in 2015 (Belgian Federal Government, 2003; International Energy 
Agency, 2016; World Nuclear Association, 2016). In 2007, however, the Commission on Energy 2030, in 
its final report, advised keeping the nuclear option open and reconsidering the nuclear phase-out as it would 
be extremely expensive and greatly unsettling for the economy under post-Kyoto constraints and in the 
absence of Carbon Capture and Storage (D’haeseleer et al., 2007). This advice was repeated two years later 
in the government-commissioned report from GEMIX on the ideal energy mix for Belgium (Groep GEMIX, 
2009). Moreover, the same Commission on Energy 2030 report defined four priorities to guarantee security 
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of supply, the following two of which are the most relevant in the framework of this study. Firstly, the 
Commission identified diversity of supply of primary sources and technologies (type and origin) as a first 
and foremost rule. Secondly, they stated that a stable investment climate must be guaranteed for competitive 
market players to have timely and sufficient new electricity generation capacity and to retain a substantial 
refinery capacity (D’haeseleer et al., 2007), a recommendation that was reiterated in the GEMIX report 
(Groep GEMIX, 2009).  
In 2009, based on the GEMIX report, the Belgian government decided to postpone the phase-out of the 
oldest reactors by 10 years, until 2025. However, new elections took place in 2010 before the postponement 
was passed by Parliament and the phase-out remained in place as originally planned, i.e. for 2015. 
In December 2011, the government confirmed that it would close the nuclear power plants in accordance 
with the phase-out law of 2003. At the same time, wholesale prices were too low and policy uncertainty too 
high to trigger investments in other baseload capacity (International Energy Agency, 2016). This coincided 
with the unforeseen long outages at two units from mid-2012 onwards due to the detection of thousands of 
quasi-laminar flaws in the forged rings of the reactor vessels (FANC, 2015). As security of supply came 
under heavy pressure, the government, with the approval of the Nuclear Safety Authority, extended the 
long-term operation of the three oldest nuclear power plant units from 2015 to 2025, in combination with a 
number of other measures (International Energy Agency, 2016).  
However, the extension to the operational license for these three nuclear plants has not solved the issue of 
security of supply. It has merely postponed it to 2022-25 when the remaining four plants will be shut down, 
as foreseen under the current policy. The International Energy Agency recommends that the government 
seriously consider what would be the optimal policy for securing affordable low-carbon electricity. It 
suggests that allowing the nuclear plants to run for as long as they are considered safe by the regulator would 
ease pressure on security of electricity supply. The extension of the nuclear license would also reduce the 
costs of electricity generation in the medium term and likely reduce the costs of the phase-out itself 
(International Energy Agency, 2016). This recommendation is in line with the recommendation formulated 
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in the European Commission’s Energy Road Map 2050 (European Commission, 2012) which states that 
nuclear energy will be required to provide a significant contribution to the energy transformation process in 
those Member States where it is pursued, as it remains a key source of low carbon electricity generation. In 
the meantime, the uncertainty about the nuclear phase-out still does not create a stable investment climate 
for competitive market players to diversify the primary power generation sources. In August 2017, the 
Federation of Enterprises in Belgium advocated more realism about the timing to close all nuclear plants 
(Belga, 2017a). And in October 2017, Belga (Belga, 2017b) reported that the current draft of the Energy 
Pact, the energy consultation between the Federal government and the regions, does not make mention 
anywhere about the feasibility of the nuclear phase-out. As the issue of the nuclear phase-out keeps 
reappearing in the news on a regular basis, this indicates the importance of our research topic.  
In this context, we will analyze how investment capacity decisions by electricity suppliers in Belgium are 
influenced by an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear license, and how these results are 
affected by the implementation of environmental energy policies, such as nuclear tax or renewable subsidies. 
In what follows, we briefly describe the background of nuclear taxes and subsidies for renewables in 
Belgium. 
2.1.1. Nuclear Taxes 
 
Two types of nuclear tax exist in Belgium, i.e. the annual fee and the nuclear tax. 
The annual fee is levied as the counterpart of the extension of the nuclear license and was established under 
the Federal Act of 31 January 2003, where it was decided that the operators of the three oldest nuclear plants 
should pay an annual fee. This fee is allocated to the ‘Energy Transition Fund’ and amounts to €20 million  
per year per reactor (Belgian Federal Government, 2003; JVH, 2016). 
The nuclear tax is a repartition contribution levied by the Belgian Federal Government since 2008 for 
nuclear plant operators, targeting the four newest nuclear plants. The contribution is calculated based on the 
capacity of the installations and changes annually as a function of the profits generated by electricity 
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production through nuclear fission. Contrary to the annual fee, this contribution is mainly aimed at funding 
the State’s energy policy – it is allocated to the General State Budget - and at increasing competition on the 
electricity market. The repartition contribution amounted to €200 million in 2015 (Synatom, 2016).  
2.1.2. Renewable Energy Subsidies 
 
Tax and non-tax incentives in favor of renewables (RE) have been introduced both at the federal level and 
at the regional level. On the one hand, the Federal government has adopted different tax incentives, such as 
tax credit for research and development and green investment tax deduction. On the other hand, the three 
regions in the country have introduced a wide range of non-tax incentives, ranging from support systems 
for research and development, ecology and energy premiums, to a system of green certificates, allowing 
producers of RE sources to receive a complementary price for their sales of RE (CREG, 2010). The system 
works on the basis of green energy quotas, which transmission system operators are required to purchase. 
The price of the certificates is determined by the market, but a minimum price is guaranteed (Belgian Federal 
Government, 2002; Flemish Government, 2009).  
Once our research question is justified, in the following section, we will describe the market power 
characteristics of the Belgian Electricity market, the related literature to market power and uncertainty in 
oligopolistic models, as well as the implication of both in the structure of the model, which is described in 
section 3. 
2.2 Market power characteristics 
As is the case for most of the electricity industry in Europe, the Belgian electricity market is vertically 
unbundled. Transmission and distribution of electric power are regulated natural monopolies. Electricity 
generators and electricity suppliers operate in a liberalized market environment. Currently, the electricity 
market is an energy-only market (KU Leuven Energy Institute, 2015). The wholesale market consists of an 
Over The Counter (OTC) market and the spot market, which is made up of the Belpex Day-Ahead Market 
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(DAM) and the Belpex Continuous Intraday Market (CIM) (Liebl, 2013). According to the KU Leuven 
Energy Institute (2015), in 2013, the total traded volume on the Belpex DAM  amounted to 17.1 TWh, or 
21% of the Elia2 grid load, and a total of about 0.6 TWh was traded on the Belpex CIM, or 1.5% of the Elia 
grid load. Even though the majority of the traded electricity volume is settled through OTC contracts, the 
DAM is of fundamental importance as a benchmark and reference point for other markets, such as OTC or 
forward markets (Grimm et al., 2008). Therefore, we model the capacity and production decisions of the 
electricity market through a closed-loop, two stage game, as suggested by Murphy and Smeers (2005) and 
other authors, using Belpex DAM data. 
Moreover, the Belgian electricity market is characterized by two specific features that have a substantial 
influence on the functioning of the market. These are presented in Table 1.   
<< insert Table 1: Overview of Belgium’s existing power generation structure (Elia, 2016a) >> 
First of all, there is a high dependence on nuclear energy, with this technology being responsible for over 
30% of the current total installed power generation capacity. The second biggest technology is the closed 
cycle gas turbine (CCGT), which accounts for almost 24% of the total installed capacity, followed by solar 
photovoltaic (PV) at 15%. Secondly, one player, i.e. Engie Electrabel, holds a dominant market position 
with more than 58% of this current capacity, including the nuclear reactors. None of the other market players 
hold a share of more than 5% of the total installed capacity. From this context, we could derive and assume 
that this is the typical situation of imperfect competition oligopolistic market in which only the dominant 
player has market power. Moreover, we could also assume that remaining small firms act as one player (the 
follower), such as price takers. A survey of the related literature of oligopolistic markets and market power 
is then needed in order to develop the design of our model. This is described in the following section.  
2.2.1 Literature related to oligopolistic market models and market power 
 
                                                            
2 Elia is Belgium’s high-voltage transmission system operator (30 kV to 380 kV), operating over 8000 km of lines 
and underground cables throughout Belgium. 
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Most of the papers dealing with decision-making in imperfect competition oligopolistic markets, which is 
the most common situation, have developed Nash-equilibrium models (see Ventosa et al., 2005 for a 
review). This is a concept of game theory in which players (in this case, electricity suppliers) choose their 
optimal decision strategies based on the strategies of all the other players. Thus, players are in Nash 
equilibrium when each firm’s strategy is the best response to the strategies employed by the other players.   
In particular, the formulation of our electricity market model as a Nash-equilibrium game is based on 
production (e.g. Leibowicz, 2015) and investment capacity decision models (e.g Filomena et al., 2014; Genc 
and Sen, 2008; Murphy and Smeers, 2005) from the existing literature. We can mainly distinguish between 
open-loop (e.g. Leibowicz, 2015), one-stage decision games, and closed-loop games (e.g Filomena et al., 
2014), two-stage or multi-stage decision games.  Leibowicz (2015) couples a regional integrated assessment 
model and a one-shot (open-loop) Nash-equilibrium model to investigate how climate policy and learning 
spillovers interact with market electricity structure to affect production decisisions, and more specifically, 
renewable technology adoption and producer profits. Filomena et al. (2014) analyze the problem of 
production decisions, technology selection and capacity investment for electricity generation in a 
competitive environment under uncertainty concerning marginal costs, by using a closed-loop game, in 
which investment decisions are made in a first stage under uncertainty and productions decisions are made 
in a second step, when the marginal cost is fixed.  
Another possible classification among Nash-equilibrium models depends basically on the type and scope of 
decisions, and market power of the different agents. On one hand, Nash-Cournot models are more easy to 
represent and are suitable for markets in which it is assumed that all players have market power, and then, 
take decisions simultaneously. Stackelberg-based models, on the other hand, consider that one 
(Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) models, e.g. Ventosa et al., 2002; Gabriel 
and Leuthold, 2010) or several agents (Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) models, 
e.g. Murphy and Smeers, 2005) can act as leaders of the market and then take decisions in a first place. 
Remaining firms (followers) take decisions subsequently in a Cournot manner. Murphy and Smeers (2005) 
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compare long-term investment in generation capacity under different market electricity structures, namely 
perfect competition and oligopolistic markets, with dynamic interactions (open-loop and closed-loop Nash 
equilibria). The closed-loop equilibrium is a two-stage decision game,  where the first stage is solved by an 
EPEC model. Ventosa et al. (2002) analyze expansion planning under imperfect competitive conditions, by 
using an MPEC approach, where the leader firm decides its optimal new capacity, subject to a set of market 
equilibrium constraints.  
Finally, we can distinguish between static and dynamic models, which consider dynamic interactions 
between players. In fact, most of the papers that analyze investment strategic decisions in competitive 
markets advocate for the use of dynamic multi-period models (e.g Genc and Sen, 2008, Murphy and Smeers, 
2005). Genc and Sen (2008) focus on investment capacity decisions in the electricity market in Ontario 
(Canada), by using the concept of S-adapted open-loop Nash equilibrium, a multi-period dynamic game 
with an uncertain demand price function. However, in these papers, authors have to make strong modelling 
assumptions due to the complexity of finding analytical solutions. For example, they consider a reduced 
number of technologies and/or periods, and players are typically assumed to be symmetric in the market. 
As a result, although their findings are sound from a theoretical perspective, they have limits in terms of its 
application to specific study cases.  
In this paper, we simplify this theoretical literature by considering a closed-loop two-stage game of 
production and investment capacity decisions, but which takes into account all the producers and 
technologies on the Belgian market. Due to the characteristic of the Belgian market, that is, one leader firm 
(Electrabel) and one follower (remaining firms), we also assume a Stackelberg-based model with MPEC 
structure in both decision stages. Moreover, in order to deal with our research question concerning decision-
making under nuclear policy uncertainty, we assume that investment decisions in the first stage are made 
under uncertainty. In this context, in the next sextion, we briefly review the existing literature of uncertainty 





2.2.2. Literature related to uncertainty in oligopolistic market models  
 
Indeed, the vast majority of oligopolistic market models considers uncertainty on economic parameters such 
as demand (e.g Genc and Sen, 2008; Murphy and Smeers, 2005), prices (e.g. Schröder, 2014), or marginal 
costs (e.g. Filomena et al., 2014) as the main sources of uncertainty on electricity markets. For example, 
Schröder (2014) pointed out the importance of considering long-term uncertainty, in this case uncertainty 
about fuel and carbon prices, on the analysis of investment decisions.  
However, little attention is paid to instability of investments caused by policy uncertainty, in particular 
uncertainty about the future of nuclear power. Recent studies have analyzed the impact of the German 
nuclear phase-out on Europe’s electricity generation and electricity prices. On the one hand, Bruninx et al. 
(2013) estimate that nuclear generation will be replaced by coal generation, leading to an increase in CO2 
emissions. They hence argue for an extension of some nuclear plants’ licenses. On the other hand, Nestle 
(2012) calls into question the reasons of the German government decision concerning nuclear plants’ license 
extension and the expected increase on overall prices in a context of nuclear phase-out. However, in these 
papers, uncertainty about the nuclear phase-out policy is not explicitly considered.  
The contribution of our paper consists of the analysis of how this uncertainty influences new investments in 
clean technologies in the Belgian market. Uncertainty is introduced in the first stage of our model, when 
taking investment decision. In particular, investment capacity decisions are made until different probabilities 
of nuclear license extension scenarios. Expansion outputs are subsequently introduced in the second stage 
of the model. In what follows, we present and describe in details the modelling approach. 
3. The Model 
The model starts from the assumption that a finite number N of firms have a finite number of technologies 
H at their disposal and have to optimally decide about their additional investment capacity possibilities 
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3 and their annual number of production hours, ,	per firm i and per technology k. These are 
chosen through a two-stage model in which, in a first stage, expansion capacities are decided under 
uncertainty about the extension of nuclear license permits. Subsequently, expansion capacities are injected 
in the second stage of the model and the annual number of production hours are decided in a certainty 
environment, for a given demand-price function. Moreover, as explained in the previous sections, due to the 
characteristics of the electricity market in the study area, we will assume an Stackelberg-based model for 
each stage, in which there is a leader firm (L) that decides its optimal decision, and a follower4 (F) that 
makes its optimal decision, knowing the capacity (in the first stage) and the production hours (in the second 
stage) of the leader. A summary of the flow of decisions in the model is illustrated in << insert Figure 1. A 
detailed description of the two-stage model is explained in the following sections. 
<< insert Figure 1: Decision process of the model >> 
 
3.1. First stage: Expansion capacity decisions 
3.1.1. Model description 
 
In a first stage, firms aim to decide about their expansion in installed capacities, , which maximize 
their expected individual profit 	(in €), where  is defined as a discrete random variable that takes the 
value  with probability γ (given) if license permits for nuclear power plants are extended, and  with 
probability (1- γ)  if not.  
                                                            
3 We acknowledge that a firm can invest in a new technology that is part of the Belgian portfolio of technologies (see 
Table 1), even if it does not have any installations on it previously. 
4 In order to simplify our Stackelberg-based model and due to the specific characteristics of the study area, the 
remaining firms have been merged in one actor (F, the follower). We acknowledge that in a Stackelberg-based model, 
followers decide in a Nash-Cournot competition model (or a Nash-Cournot game) in which a finite number of non-
cooperative firms maximize their profits, taking into account the decisions of the other firms, (see Genc and Sen, 2008; 
Leibowicz, 2015). A Nash equilibrium for this game exists and can be derived from the optimality conditions of the 




Let I={L, F} denote the set of firms in the market, K={1..H} denote the set of available technologies and 
S={1,2}, the set of probability scenarios concerning the extension of nuclear license permits, 
	 ∗ 1 ∗ ,                                                            ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ ,                         (1) 
with  
∑ ,                                                                                      ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ .            (2) 
and  , the individual profit per probability scenario per technology.  
Firstly,  is described in equation (3) as the difference between the individual total income  and 
the individual total cost  per technology, per probability scenario,  
	 ,	                                                            ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ .            (3) 
If we describe the previous equation in detail,  
	 ∗ 	 subs k ,                           ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ ,      (4)           
where   is the quantity of electricity produced (in MWh) (equation (5)), 	is the electricity price (in 
€/MWh) (equation (7)), and subs(k) are subsidies received per technology (in €/MWh). In particular, we 
assume subs(k) > 0 for renewable technologies and subs(k) = 0 for the others. 
Moreover, the individual amount of electricity produced per technology, for each probability scenario s, is 
the product of the annual quantity of production hours  (in hours/year) and the final installed capacity, 
, which is described in equation (6) as the sum of the current installed capacity  (in MW), and 
the additional investment in capacity per firm and technology,  (in MW), 
∗ 	 ,                                                                    (5) 
		 	 ,                        ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ .      (6)             
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Note that, in order to distinguish the different probability scenarios s, we consider	 0 and 
0. 
Next, the electricity price 	depends linearly on demand (see equation (7)), where coefficients a and b will 
be estimated later (see section 4.3) by linear regression, 
a b ∗ 	∑ 	 ,,                                                             ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ .            (7) 
Finally, as described in equation (8), the individual total cost, per technology and probability scenario, 
,	is made up of four components. The first component corresponds to the variable cost depending on 
the amount of electricity produced per technology, in particular, the sum of ,  and feedstock costs, 
 (both in €/MWh). The variable cost includes variable operational and maintenance costs. It is a 
production-related cost which varies with electrical generation/consumption, and excludes personnel, fuel 
and CO2 emission costs. The second component corresponds to fixed operational and maintenance costs 
(excluding personnel and refurbishment costs) per technology  (in €/MW), which depend on final 
installed capacity  (in MW). The third component consists of the capital expenditure, or investment 
cost, which is defined as a quadratic cost function with respect to additional investment capacity,  (in 
MW) with , the unitary marginal investment cost per technology (€/MW ). Finally, the last 
component consists of the tax , in this case only applicable to nuclear energy and solely dependent on 
whether or not the technology is being used. 
	 VC k FSC k ∗ 	 FC k ∗ 	 CC k ∗ 	 	 t ,                                          
                                                           ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ .            (8)             
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3.1.2. Model resolution 
 
As explained above, the first stage of the game is also a two-stage game in itself, in the sense that the leader 
firm choses first about its expansion capacity per technology, , and the follower choses subsequently 
about its expansion capacity per technology, , knowing the decision of the leader. 
We firstly formulate the first-order optimality conditions, also known as the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
conditions, of the follower problem in the first stage. These are the derivatives of the follower firm’s 
objective functions 		with respect to decision variables  and will be used as a constraint of the 
“Leader” main optimization problem. 






0                                      									∀ ∈ ,               (9) 
with,   
	
	 ∗ subs k ∗ 	∑ 	 ,                                (10) 
            
	 ,                          (11) 
	 b ∗ 	 ,                           (12) 
and,             
	 ∗ VC FSC 	 FC CC ∗ ,  





Next, the problem of the leader is solved by means of a non-linear, Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC) structure, executed in GAMS using the MPEC solver (GAMS Development 
Corporation, 2010), 




                                                               s.t  1 8 	 	 9 13), 
, 
                                            ∀ ∈ ,			∀ ∈ ,   
where 	represent the parameter of the maximum amount of expansion capacity per technology.   
3.2. Second stage: Production hours decisions 
3.2.1. Model description 
In a second stage, firms decide on the amount of production hours  that maximize their individual 
profit 	(in €), by knowing their installed capacities, . More specifically, decisions are taken under 
a certainty environment in which the final installed capacities correspond to the current installed capacities 
of the current situation (probability scenario s=1), ,	that is, when nuclear installations are present, plus the 
given expansion capacities found in the first stage of the model,	 ∗ .       
Thus,  
		 	 ∗ ,     																																																∀ ∈ ,			∀ ∈                (14)         
Model parameters and model equations (2)-(8) on individual profit , individual total income , 
individual amount of electricity produced ,	final installed capacity ,	price-demand function ,	 
and individual total cost   per technology , in the second stage are then, the sames than for the first 
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stage of the model, but the only probability (or installed capacity scenario) considered is s=1, avoiding then 
the probability scenario notation. 
3.2.2. Model resolution 
 
As in section 3.1.2, we first formulate the KKT conditions of the follower firm, which will be used as a 
constrant of the main “leader” problem in the second stage. 
The second stage KKT conditions for the follower are the derivatives of 	with respect to the decision 
variable : 
	
	 ∗ subs 	 ∗ 	∑ 	  ,                                               (15)         
	 ,              (16) 
	 b ∗ 	 ,              (17) 
and,              
	 ∗ 	 VC FSC ,       																						∀ ∈ .                  (18)  
 




                                                                  s.t  1 8 	 	 14 18) 
	 ,                            
  ∀ ∈ 	, ∀ ∈ ,   
where 	represent the parameter of the maximum number (per year) of operating hours per 
technology.   
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4. Model Parameterization and assumptions 
4.1. Technology assumptions 
The starting point of the model is the current capacity of the different technologies installed in Belgium for 
the leader firm and the follower firm (see Table 2). These data were obtained from Elia (Elia, 2016a).   
Table 2 provides an overview of the most relevant economic parameter values, as well as assumptions made 
on maximum values of decision variables.  
<< insert Table 2: Economic parameter values (left-hand side) and maximum values assumed 
for decision variables (right-hand side), per firm i and technology k >>  
Data regarding capital investment costs 5 and fixed and variable operational costs,   and   
respectively, were taken from the ETRI Report (Joint Research Centre, 2014). Feedstock costs  were 
taken from Laleman et al. (2012) for all technologies except anaerobic digestion. For the latter technology, 
feedstock costs were calculated based on assumptions from a 2016 report by the Flemish Energy Agency 
VEA (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017). 
The maximum amount of production hours per technology  was taken from Albrecht and Laleman 
(2014), while the maximum possible expansion capacity for all firms per technology   was derived 
from a number of sources. First of all, the maximum capacity for offshore wind was taken from the Elia 
study on adequacy and flexibility in the Belgian electricity system (Elia, 2016b).  Secondly, the maximum 
expansion capacity for onshore wind production for Belgium was calculated in the following way. The 
maximum wind production potential (European Wind Energy Association, 2005), being 5 TWh per year, 
was divided by the maximum amount of full load hours to determine the maximum capacity. The present 
installed capacity ∑  was then detracted from the maximum final capacity ∑ , resulting in the 
maximum possible expansion capacity 	 ,	which was finally split into equal parts in order to obtain 
                                                            
5 We assume that investment costs are amortized over 20 years.  
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the maximum possible expansion capacity per firm. Similar calculations were conducted for solar PV 
technology. In this case, however, we estimated the maximum annual production by first calculating the 
potential for building integrated photovoltaics for Belgium (International Energy Agency, 2001), followed 
by the calculation of the energy produced each month by taking into account monthly solar irradiance and 
number of days per month. As described in the nuclear exit framework (see section 2.1), there will no further 
expansion of nuclear energy. Moreover, due to the commitments made by Europe to reduce CO2 emissions, 
we assume that there will be no expansion in the capacity of coal-fired power plants (Elia, 2016b). Equally, 
as Belgium has very limited potential to increase its hydro capacity, we assume that there will be no 
expansion in the capacity of this particular technology either (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014b). Finally, we 
assume that municipal solid waste incinerators are built with the objective of getting rid of the last non-
recyclable fraction of municipal waste and not with the objective of producing additional power. We 
therefore assume that the expansion in capacity of this particular technology will also be zero. 
4.2. Nuclear taxes and renewable energy subsidies 
Section 2.1.1 explains the details of the nuclear tax calculation. However, to reduce model complexity, we 
opted to use a lump sum of €250 million instead of a more complex calculation. This amount is the sum of 
nuclear taxes for all Belgian plants in 2008. 
In order to keep computational calculations feasible for the model, subsidies for renewable energy (RE) 
were set at €93 per MWh produced for all RE technologies, except for municipal solid waste incineration. 
In Flanders, this is the minimum amount of support for all RE installations with a starting date of 1 January 
2013  independent of the type of RE technology that is used. This amount of support was set in articles 7.1.6 
and 7.1.7 of the Energy Decree (Flemish Government, 2009). For installations with a starting date before 1 
January 2013 the system is much more complex (see VREG, n.d. for an overview). Municipal solid waste 
incinerators also receive subsidies in Flanders, as part of the waste is considered as a ‘renewable’ energy 
source. This fraction consists of food waste, badly sorted paper and cardboard, etc. As the waste is not 
considered to be 100% renewable, subsidies amount to €60 per MWh produced (Pauwels, 2016). As energy 
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subsidies are regionalized (see section 2.1.2), a different system exists for the region of Wallonia and 
Brussels-capital (Elia, 2016c). However, to reduce model complexity we opted to use the Flemish approach 
for all power production. 
4.3. Electricity price demand function 
The electricity price is endogenously determined by the model through a linear demand-price function (see 
equation 7). This demand-price function is based on Belpex data regarding average electricity price on the 
day-ahead market (in €/MWh) (Belpex, 2016) from 2006 to 2014. We used day-ahead (spot) market data 
because, as previously mentioned in Section 2.2, according to Grimm et al. (2008), the DAM price is of 
fundamental importance as benchmark and reference point for other markets. For each year of data, we 
calculated the average hourly quantity of electricity produced (in MWh) as well as the average electricity 
price (in €/MWh). We then conducted a linear regression using the statistical computing language R (R 
Development Core Team, 2008), version 3.1.2, where coefficients  and  of equation (7) were determined:  
49.74, 
0.001679. 
Finally, as Belpex DAM data is available on an hourly basis and the simulations in our decision model are 
made on a yearly basis, we had to make the transition from years (calculated in the model) to hours (derived 
from the Belpex data) in the price demand function. Therefore, in the function, we divided the total quantity 
of electricity produced ∑ 	,  by 8760, i.e., the amount of hours in one year. The adapted function we 
use in the model simulations then becomes 






4.4. Investment cost function 
We assume a quadratic investment cost function to capture increasing costs of additional investments which 
will stimulate firms to expand with multiple technologies, and to obtain more qualitative results (Genc and 
Sen, 2008; Genc and Zaccour, 2011). These increasing costs capture, for instance, the effect that the best 
locations to invest in technologies such as wind or solar PV are taken first at a lower cost. A higher capacity 
will require most costs to find more suitable places and make them available for the generation of power. In 
particular, the investment cost function per firm per technology is assumed to be convex and increasing with 
respect to investment capacity expansion 	 , and has the following functional form: 
∗ 	 ∗ 	  , 
with  and  positive parameters. 
Because we do not have sufficient data to regress investment expenses with respect to additional investment 
capacity, we attribute all investment expenses to the quadratic term6. Thus, we assume d(k) = 0 and e(k) = 
CC(k), where CC(k) is the marginal unit investment cost per technology and is taken from the ETRI Report 
(Joint Research Centre, 2014). As final results could be affected by this important assumption, a discussion 
of these parameter costs is provided in the scenario analysis in section 5.3. 
5. Results  
In this section, we analyze how an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear license, coupled with 
the implementation of renewable (RE) subsidies and nuclear taxes, influences investment capacity (first 
stage) and productivity (second stage) decisions by electricity suppliers in equilibrium. We first look at the 
effect of an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear license, or, equivalently, a decrease in the 
probability of nuclear phase-out, on additional installed capacities, production, prices and profits of Belgian 
electricity suppliers, taking into account RE subsidies and nuclear taxes. To this goal, simulated results are 
                                                            
6 Other papers such as Genc and Thille (2011) argued that this type of convex investment cost function may stem 
from adjustment costs, which are due to costs of installing and/or removing equipment. 
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shown for different predefined probabilities for extension of the nuclear license, in the absence and presence 
of taxes and RE subsidies respectively. The benchmark scenario calculates the Stackelberg equilibrium with 
nuclear tax and renewable (RE) subsidies, assuming that nuclear license permits will be extended ( 1). 
We also look at a high ( 0.75), medium ( 0.5),  low ( 0.25), and nil ( 0)  probability for 
extension, the latter corresponding to a probability scenario in which nuclear phase-out is guaranteed. 
Finally, we look at the effect of the implementation of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes, on simulated results, 
by comparing results without and with RE subsidies and nuclear taxes. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
main results. More detailed results can be found in the annexes. 
<< insert Table 3: Overview of results for the different model scenarios >> 
5.1. Effect of probability of extending the nuclear license 
To understand the effects of an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear license, we compare 
model results for different predefined probabilities γ of extending the nuclear license for the case of RE 
subsidies and nuclear taxes, which corresponds to the current situation in Belgium (see rows 2-6 in Table 
3).  
First of all, we look at additional investments (or expansion) in installed capacity depending on the level of 
probability γ (see column 3 of Table 3). We can see that lower probabilities of license extension result in 
higher investments in capacity. This is because, when the probability of extension is low, players expect 
that more non-nuclear capacity will be needed to fulfill demand and then, more investments take place. 
More specifically, Figure 2 shows how the leader and follower expand depending on the level of probability 
γ, (see also Annex 4 for detailed numbers). 
<< insert Figure 2: Expansion in capacity (in MW) in function of the level of probability of 




Again, a lower probability of extension corresponds to a higher level of expansions for both players. We 
can observe that, even if the follower has higher levels of capacity expansion as compared to the leader in 
order to be able to compete - and this for each level of γ -, the expansion by the leader is more influenced 
by an increase of probability. For example, when probability of nuclear license extensions increases from 0 
(nuclear phase-out) to 1 (nuclear extension), expansion capacity increases by 1 655 MW for the leader and 
568 MW for the follower. The reason here for this is that, with decreasing probability for nuclear license 
extension, the leader, who owns all the nuclear capacity, is more inclined to further expand in order to 
compensate losses for the non-use of nuclear. 
Next, << insert Figure 3 presents the portfolio of technologies that are used for the expansion, depending on 
the probability of nuclear license extension (see also Annex 3 for detailed numbers and Annex 2 for results 
per player). 
<< insert Figure 3: Installed capacity expansion (in MW) per technology and probability level γ 
>> 
 
First of all, the figure shows that expansion takes place in renewable energy technologies only. Moreover, 
we can distinguish between two groups: those technologies that use biomass as feedstock (anaerobic 
digestion, biomass CHP cogeneration and biomass grate furnace steam turbines), and those technologies 
that do not use any feedstock, namely intermittent (i.e. non-flexible) renewables (i.e. offshore and onshore 
wind turbines and solar PV). Moreover, the figure indicates that the largest expansion takes place in two 
technologies, i.e. biomass grate furnace steam turbines and offshore wind for different reasons: offshore 
wind is a cheap technology in terms of LCOE7 costs (see LCOE calculations in Annex 7) and biomass grate 
furnace because of the absence of expansion limits, combined with the fact that it is the technology with the 
                                                            
7 For details on technology costs, please refer to the specific LCOE calculations in Annex 4. We define the LCOE 
per technology, as the total costs divided by the total production per technology (in euros/MW).When we compare 
these values to the ones from other sources (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014b), we can see that they are in the same 
order of magnitude. Of course, due to the variable nature of the modeling, our LCOE values are lower as compared 
to the above-mentioned sources. 
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lowest investment costs with respect to the other biomass based technologies (see Table 2). While, with 
increasing probability of nuclear extension, the expansion in capacity decreases for all technologies, the 
ratio with which this decrease happens is different for all technologies. Biomass-based technologies appear 
to be more influenced by a decrease in license extension probability than the others. For instance, the 
increase in expansion for anaerobic digestion from probability γ=1 to γ=0 is around 132% while it is only 
around 6% for solar PV. Onshore and offshore are the technologies that are the least influenced by a decrease 
in probability of license extension, because they are always expanded to the maximum capacity expansion 
limits. 
Next, as can be observed in column 5 of << insert Table 3, total production decreases with increasing 
probability for license extension. As producing hours (see Annex 6) are not influenced by a change in 
probability, total production follows the same tendency as investments in capacity. For details regarding 
production per technology and probability level, we refer to Annex 8.  
Moreover, as the total production decreases with increasing probability, prices8 will increase with increasing 
probability of nuclear license extension (see Table 3, column 6). This means that the leader (Electrabel) 
places upward pressure on prices when a nuclear license is highly likely.  
More specifically, in the total absence of nuclear power (γ = 0), electricity prices will decrease by around 
8.5%9 with respect to the baseline case, (γ = 1), in which the license extension is guaranteed, a statement 
that is in contradiction by numerous reports on the Belgian power sector (D’haeseleer et al., 2007; Febeliec, 
2017; Groep GEMIX, 2009; International Energy Agency, 2016).  
Finally, we can observe that total profits are non-monotonic with respect to the probability of license 
extension (see Table 3, column 4), and reach the highest value in the absence of uncertainty, that is when 
                                                            
8 We acknowledge that electricity price is assumed to be a linear (with negative slope) function with respect to 
demand, as explained in section 4.3. 
9 Prices obtained in the scenario of total absence (γ = 0) and presence (γ = 1), of nuclear power for the case of RE 
subsidies and nuclear taxes are 26.897 and 29.39 euro/MWh, respectively. 
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nuclear license extension or nuclear phase-out are guaranteed. Overall, total profits reach the maximum 
value for γ = 1, which correspond to the scenario with the maximum simulated price. For profits per player, 
please refer to Annex 1.  
5.2. Effect of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear tax 
Next, we analyze the effect of the implementation of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes on the firms’ decisions, 
by comparing results with RE subsidies (see rows 2 and 6 in Table 3) and results without RE subsidies  (see 
rows 7 and 11 in Table 3). The detailed numbers for this comparison can be found in the annexes. 
As expected, the numbers in Table 3 show that the implementation of RE subsidies promotes investment in 
RE capacity. The total installed capacity increases almost eight-fold for each probability of nuclear license 
extension. The model also simulates a shift in choice of technologies driven by RE subsidies. This can be 
seen in Figure 4. Without RE subsidies (left-hand side of the figure), the model favors onshore wind over 
offshore wind and solar PV. When subsidies are provided, biomass-based technologies enter the electricity 
mix. These results are mainly driven by the capacity limit for onshore (i.e. 947 MW in total) and offshore 
wind (i.e. 1 588 MW in total), and the quadratic investment cost function for all technologies. The RE 
subsidies stimulate both players to expand in RE technologies. They would do so preferably in the cheapest 
technology (see LCOE calculation in Annex 4) but, with increasing capacity, also the investment costs are 
simulated to increase (see section 4.4). The result is that the producers diversify their choice of technology 
when RE are provided.  
<< insert Figure  4: Expanded installed capacity per technology in absence (left-hand side) and 
in case (right-hand side) of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes >> 
 
 The above-mentioned results constitute a key element for decision-making in order to create a long-term 
stable investment strategy. Indeed, as stated in the existing literature, a very high share of intermittent (i.e. 
non-flexible) renewables (i.e. solar PV and wind) may reduce the security of the energy supply and grid 
stability and result in higher overall system costs (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014b; Szarka et al., 2013). 
Biomass-based conversion systems, on the other hand, while having high feedstock costs, offer technical 
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alternatives for flexible power generation to compensate for fluctuations and the resulting residual load 
(Szarka et al., 2013). In our specific case, we see that the presence of subsidies increases the overall 
production share of biomass-based systems from around 7% to around 30-40% of the total production, 
depending on the probability scenario.  
Overall, results follow the same patterns as in the previous section when the probability of nuclear license 
extension increases, but quantity levels are higher in the presence of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes. Thus, 
investment and total production decrease, while prices increase with increasing probabilities of nuclear 
extension. However, the presence of subsidies reduces the effect of the increase in probability, on total 
expansion capacity and, then, on total production. In particular, total expansion capacity decreases by 37%, 
from γ = 0 to γ = 1, in absence of subsidies, and just by 21%, from γ = 0 to γ = 1, that is, in presence of 
subsidies.  
Finally, total profits are not greatly influenced by a change in the probability of nuclear license extension, 
and follow a different pattern in absence of RE subsidies and taxes as compared to the presence of RE 
subsidies and taxes. In the absence of subsidies and taxes, total profits slightly decrease (as does the total 
production) with increasing probability of license extension (see Table 3, column 4), in particular, 
decreasing of 0.8 % from γ = 0 to γ = 1. In presence of subsidies and taxes, on the contrary, profits only 
slightly increase, by 0.1 % from γ = 0 to γ = 1. Therefore, we can conclude that the implementation of 
subsidies and taxes slows down the effect of the increase in probability on total profits.  
5.3. Scenario analysis of quadratic investment cost function 
One important assumption of the model relates to the quadratic investment cost function (described in 
section 4.4). Because of the lack of data to estimate a quadratic cost function with respect to the additional 
investment capacity, we conducted a scenario analysis with different investment cost parameters in order to 
validate our choice which corresponds to the baseline case in Table 4. As can be seen in Table 4, we 
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simulated four different scenarios, i.e. Baseline, Scenario 1a, Scenario 1b, Scenario 1c, in such a way that 
the marginal unitary cost per technology, d(k)+e(k), is the same. 
<< insert Table 4: Results of the different quadratic investment cost scenarios for each 
technology >> 
More specifically, simulation results regarding the optimal total additional investment capacity and expected 
profit are shown for the model probability scenario 1, our benchmark case. We don’t observe important 
changes in total expansion capacities per quadratic cost scenario. Simulated investments are less than 5% 
lower in the scenario 1c than in the baseline scenario. However, expected total profits are significantly 
different for the different quadratic cost function scenarios. In particular, we found the maximum value in 
the baseline case to be €1 829 (in millions). Therefore, due to the small differences on investments per 
scenario, we used the values of the case for which we obtain the maximum profits for our analysis, the 
baseline case. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
The Belgian power sector currently finds itself in a state of uncertainty regarding the nuclear phase-out. 
Until now, the government’s official position has been that the remaining four nuclear reactors will be shut 
down in 2022-2025 without license extension. However, seeing that a permit extension was granted for the 
oldest reactors in 2015 and taking into account the shortage of electricity supply, opinions are divided about 
whether or not the current permits should be extended, creating an uncertain investment climate.  
In this context, the goal of our study was to analyze how, for the Belgian electricity market, uncertainty 
about nuclear phase-out, coupled with the implementation of renewable (RE) subsidies and nuclear taxes, 
affects investment capacity and productivity decisions by electricity suppliers.  
A Stackelberg-based equilibrium model was developed that allows to consider the power market 
characteristics of the Belgian electricity suppliers, that is a leader firm that takes decisions first, and a 
follower firm (remaining small firms), that take decisions subsequently. Moreover, suppliers’ decisions are 
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chosen through a two-stage model in which, in a first stage, expansion capacities are decided under 
uncertainty about the extension of nuclear license permits, that is, under different probabilities of nuclear 
license extension. Subsequently, expansion capacities are injected in the second stage of the model and the 
annual number of production hours are decided in a certainty environment.. 
Our analysis indicates that, regardless of subsidies, an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear 
licenses results in lower levels of investment - primarily in renewable energy -,  lower levels of total 
production and a higher electricity price. In absence of renewable subsidies and nuclear taxes, this increase 
in probability leads to a slightly decrease in total expected profits, due to the decrease in total production. 
However, we show that the implementation of renewable subsidies and nuclear taxes reduces the effect of 
the increase in probability, on total expansion capacity decisions, and total profits.  
Moreover, the results show that, in the framework of decarbonization of the energy sector, there should be 
continued support for renewable energy in the form of subsidies, as these help to secure supply and diversify 
the energy mix. Indeed, RE subsidies promote new investments in renewable technologies.  
Finally, our study derives relevant policy implications regarding the debate on nuclear energy. While the 
Belgian government currently seems committed to a nuclear phase-out, as is the case in many other 
European countries (Golombek et al., 2015), the biggest policital party since the 2014 Belgian parliament 
elections is questioning the phase-out, and most scientific reports recommend extending the nuclear license 
in order to reduce the current pressure on supply uncertainty, on the condition that the safety of the plants 
can be ensured (D’haeseleer et al., 2007; Febeliec, 2017; Groep GEMIX, 2009; International Energy 
Agency, 2016). Related to the safety issue but from the point of view of the individual user, Welsch and 
Biermann (2014) used survey data for 139517 individuals in 21 European countries and found that 
preferences, in terms of subjective well-being, for solar & wind power over nuclear power have risen 
drastically after the Fukushima nuclear accident. In this study, we show that, in the absence of uncertainty 
about future nuclear energy production, i.e. when nuclear license extension or nuclear phase-out is 
guaranteed, the demand for electricity can be fulfilled by investing in renewable energy. In particular, in the 
30 
 
case of permit extensions, results show that electricity prices will be around 9.3% higher, and there will be 
around 27% less investment in additional RE capacity as compared to the case of total absence of nuclear 
production. Moreover, these installations will be necessary in the future in order to fulfill demand. 
Therefore, extending the nuclear license would only postpone the problem of security of supply. A long-
term energy strategy without uncertainty regarding nuclear phase-out and taking into account the future 
environmental benefits of RE technologies becomes necessary in order to ensure a stable investment climate. 
There are possible extensions of our paper. First of all, we could improve our static model by using a multi-
period dynamic model in order to analyze the effect of uncertainty about nuclear phase-out on the evolution 
of investment capacity decisions over time. Also, a more complex demand-price function could be 
considered in the modeling - for example a constant elasticity demand function. We make the implicit 
assumption that electricity demand is the same throughout the year. However, demand is usually higher at 
night time as compared to day time, and in winter as compared to summer. This can be incorporated in the 
model by splitting the year into different periods, and estimating different demand price functions for each 
of these periods. Moreover, we could also analyze the results for an endogenously determined probability 
as compared to a exogenously determined and fixed probability in the current model. Finally, we made the 
assumption that Belgian electricity supply equals Belgian demand. In reality, however, Belgium imports a 
net amount of electricity from abroad. In 2014, this net import amounted to 17 508 GWh from France, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg (ENTSO-E, 2016). An alternative to increasing local generation capacity is 
to increase the transmission capacity from neighboring countries. In order to incorporate this aspect in our 
model, we could consider neighboring countries as additional players in the Belgian electricity market in a 








probability Leader Follower 
RE subsidies and 
nuclear taxes 
γ = 1 1701 1953 
γ = 0.75 1693 1950 
γ = 0.5 1680 1945 
γ = 0.25 1662 1939 
γ = 0 1756 1895 
No RE subsidies 
and no nuclear 
taxes 
γ = 1 996 294 
γ = 0.75 999 295 
γ = 0.5 1000 295 
γ = 0.25 1000 296 
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γ = 1 
onshore wind 332 466 
offshore wind 794 794 offshore wind 135 200 
solar PV 0 1177 solar PV 0 295 
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 1252 1531         
anaerobic digestion 0 697 
γ = 0.75 
onshore wind 404 473 
Biomass CHP cogeneration 482 592 offshore wind 170 218 
        solar PV 0 318 
γ = 0.75 
onshore wind 473 473         
offshore wind 794 794 
γ = 0.5 
onshore wind 473 473 
solar PV 0 1196 offshore wind 205 235 
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 1410 1605 solar PV 0 340 
anaerobic digestion 0 725         
Biomass CHP cogeneration 544 621 
γ = 0.25 
onshore wind 473 473 
        offshore wind 240 253 
γ = 0.5 
onshore wind 473 473 solar PV 0 364 
offshore wind 794 794 CCGT conventional CHP 0 0 
solar PV 0 1214         
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 1569 1679 
γ = 0 
onshore wind 473 473 
anaerobic digestion 0 752 offshore wind 275 270 
Biomass CHP cogeneration 607 650 solar PV 393 386 
             
γ = 0.25 
onshore wind 473 473      
offshore wind 794 794      
solar PV 0 1233      
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 1727 1754      
anaerobic digestion 0 780      
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Biomass CHP cogeneration 669 679      
             
γ = 0 
onshore wind 473 473      
offshore wind 794 794      
solar PV 0 1247      
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 1853 1812      
anaerobic digestion 817 802      







Annex 3: Total expansion per technology 
 
total expansion (MW) probability 
onshore 
wind 








RE subsidies and 
nuclear taxes 
γ = 1 947 1588 1177 2782 697 1073 
γ = 0.75 947 1588 1196 3015 725 1165 
γ = 0.5 947 1588 1214 3248 752 1257 
γ = 0.25 947 1588 1233 3481 780 1348 
γ = 0 947 1588 1247 3665 1619 1421 
No RE subsidies and 
no nuclear taxes 
γ = 1 799 336 295       
γ = 0.75 877 388 318     
γ = 0.5 947 440 340     
γ = 0.25 947 493 364     




Annex 4: Total expansion per player 
 
total expansion (MW) probability Leader Follower 
RE subsidies and 
nuclear taxes 
γ = 1 3000 5263 
γ = 0.75 3221 5413 
γ = 0.5 3442 5563 
γ = 0.25 3663 5713 
γ = 0 4655 5831 
No RE subsidies and 
no nuclear taxes 
γ = 1 467 962 
γ = 0.75 574 1009 
γ = 0.5 679 1049 
γ = 0.25 714 1089 



















γ = 1 






γ = 1 
onshore wind 344 1703 
offshore wind 1181 1119 offshore wind 522 526 
solar PV 0 4130 solar PV 0 3248 
OCGT advanced 48 416 OCGT advanced 48 416 
CCGT 2430 1393 CCGT 2430 1393 
pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 
nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 
biomass furnace steam 1615 1531 biomass grate furnace steam turbine 363 0 
anaerobic digestion 0 886 anaerobic digestion 0 189 
biomass CHP cogen 532 609 biomass CHP cogeneration 50 18 
hydropower run-of-river 12 74 hydropower run-of-river 12 74 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 
LVN/LF 224 0 LVN/LF 224 0 
γ = 0.75 
onshore wind 485 1710 
γ = 0.75 
onshore wind 416 1710 
offshore wind 1181 1119 offshore wind 557 543 
solar PV 0 4148 solar PV 0 3270 
OCGT advanced 48 416 OCGT advanced 48 416 
CCGT 2430 1393 CCGT 2430 1393 
pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 
nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 
biomass furnace steam 1773 1605 biomass grate furnace steam turbine 363 0 
anaerobic digestion 0 913 anaerobic digestion 0 189 
biomass CHP cogen 594 639 biomass CHP cogeneration 50 18 
hydropower run-of-river 12 74 hydropower run-of-river 12 74 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 
LVN/LF 224 0 LVN/LF 224 0 
γ = 0.5 onshore wind 485 1710 γ = 0.5 onshore wind 485 1710 
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offshore wind 1181 1119 offshore wind 592 560 
solar PV 0 4167 solar PV 0 3293 
OCGT advanced 48 416 OCGT advanced 48 416 
CCGT 2430 1393 CCGT 2430 1393 
pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 
nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 
biomass furnace steam 1932 1679 biomass grate furnace steam turbine 363 0 
anaerobic digestion 0 941 anaerobic digestion 0 189 
biomass CHP cogen 657 668 biomass CHP cogeneration 50 18 
hydropower run-of-river 12 74 hydropower run-of-river 12 74 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 
LVN/LF 224 0 LVN/LF 224 0 
γ = 0.25 
onshore wind 485 1710 
γ = 0.25 
onshore wind 485 1710 
offshore wind 1181 1119 offshore wind 627 578 
solar PV 0 4185 solar PV 0 3316 
OCGT advanced 48 416 OCGT advanced 48 416 
CCGT 2430 1393 CCGT 2430 1393 
pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 
nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 
biomass furnace steam 2090 1754 biomass grate furnace steam turbine 363 0 
anaerobic digestion 0 969 anaerobic digestion 0 189 
biomass CHP cogen 719 697 biomass CHP cogeneration 50 18 
hydropower run-of-river 12 74 hydropower run-of-river 12 74 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 
LVN/LF 224 0 LVN/LF 224 0 
γ = 0 
onshore wind 485 1710 
γ = 0 
onshore wind 485 1710 
offshore wind 1181 1119 offshore wind 662 595 
solar PV 0 4200 solar PV 393 3339 
OCGT advanced 48 416 OCGT advanced 48 416 
CCGT 2430 1393 CCGT 2430 1393 
pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 pulverised supercritical coal plants 0 940 
nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 nuclear fission generation II 5926 0 
biomass furnace steam 2216 1812 biomass grate furnace steam turbine 363 0 
anaerobic digestion 817 991 anaerobic digestion 0 189 
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biomass CHP cogen 768 720 biomass CHP cogeneration 50 18 
hydropower run-of-river 12 74 hydropower run-of-river 12 74 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
hydropower dam and reservoir 
>100MW 1164 144 
municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 municipal solid waste incinerator 72 158 




Annex 6: Quantity of producing hours per technology for all model scenarios.  
 
technology producing hours 
onshore wind 2277.6 
offshore wind 2715.6 
solar PV 1007.4 
Pulverised supercritical coal plants 7008 
nuclear fission generation II 7884 
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 5956.8 
anaerobic digestion 5956.8 
Biomass CHP cogeneration 5956.8 
CCGT conventional CHP 5956.8 
CCGT advanced CHP 5956.8 
hydropower run-of-river 2978.4 
hydropower dam and reservoir >100MW 2978.4 






Annex 7: Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) per technology and per model scenario 
 
LCOE (euro.MWh-1) RE subsidies and nuclear taxes No RE subsidies and no nuclear taxes 
technology γ = 1 γ = 0.75 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0.75 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 γ = 0 
onshore wind 3.97 3.97 3.97 3.97 3.97 3.29 3.63 3.97 3.97 3.97 
offshore wind 19.87 19.87 19.87 19.87 19.87 4.15 4.58 5.06 5.59 6.14 
solar PV 8.99 9.21 9.43 9.66 9.84 1.48 1.58 1.68 1.8 2.8 
OCGT advanced NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
CCGT NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
pulverised supercritical coal plants 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 33.89 
pulverised supercritical lignine plants NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 76.67 
nuclear fission generation II 21.35 21.35 21.35 21.35 21.35 16 16 16 16 16 
biomass grate furnace steam turbine 94.11 95.42 96.77 98.15 99.26 79.03 79.03 79.03 79.03 79.03 
anaerobic digestion 78.36 78.79 79.23 79.66 81.24 69.44 69.44 69.44 69.44 69.44 
biomass CHP cogeneration 86.86 87.52 88.2 88.9 89.45 79.01 79.01 79.01 79.01 79.01 
CCGT conventional CHP 52.4 52.4 52.4 NA 52.4 NA 52.4 52.4 163.89 NA 
CCGT advanced CHP 54 54 54 NA 54 NA 54 54 54 NA 
hydropower run-of-river 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 
hydropower dam and reservoir >100MW 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 
hydropower dam and reservoir 10-100MW 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
hydropower dam and reservoir <10MW 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 














































γ = 1 5000 6246 4160 6588 46719 18735 5277 6798 256 3896 1367 
γ = 0.75 5000 6246 4179 6588 46719 20122 5441 7344 256 3896 1367 
γ = 0.5 5000 6246 4198 6588 46719 21509 5606 7890 256 3896 1367 
γ = 0.25 5000 6246 4216 6588 46719 22897 5771 8436 256 3896 1367 






γ = 1 4663 2845 3272 6588 46719 2162 1125 404 256 3896 1367 
γ = 0.75 4842 2988 3295 6588 46719 2162 1125 404 256 3896 1367 
γ = 0.5 5000 3130 3318 6588 46719 2162 1125 404 256 3896 1367 
γ = 0.25 5000 3273 3341 6588 46719 2162 1125 404 256 3896 1367 
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Table 1: Overview of Belgium’s existing power generation structure (Elia, 2016a) 
Technology Installed capacity per 
technology (MW) 
Suppliers Installed capacity per 
supplier (MW) 
Nuclear fission 5 926 (30.7%) Axpo trading 119 (0.6%) 
Coal 1 164 (6.0%) EDF Luminus 820 (4.2%) 
OCGT 464 (2.4%) Engie Electrabel 11 339 (58.8%) 
CCGT 4 588 (23.8%) Electrawinds 
Distributie 
38 (0.2%) 
Biomass (furnace and 
anaerobic digestion) 
620 (3.2%) Eneco Energy Trade 270 (1.4%) 
Hydropower 1 394 (7.2%) Enel Trade 405 (2.1%) 
Solar PV 2 953 (15.3%) GETEC Energie 556 (2.9%) 
Wind (onshore and 
offshore) 
1 961 (10.2%) Lampiris 243 (1.3%) 
Waste incineration 230 (1.2%) RWE Supply & 
Trading 
305 (1.6%) 




Other10 4 227 (21.9 %) 
 Total Leader  11 339 (58.8%) 
 Total Follower 7 961 (41.2%) 
 
                                                            
10 ‘Other’ in this case is actually the grouping together of different renewable energy technologies which are not 
exploited solely by one producer but operated by SME’s and households. These technologies are onshore and 
offshore wind energy, solar PV and anaerobic digestion. 
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Table 2: Economic parameter values (left-hand side) and maximum values assumed for 


























1249 3470 37.8 0 0 2716 1588+ 
Onshore 
wind 
712 1400 128.4 0 0 2278 947** 
Solar PV 2953 980 16.7 0 0 1007 5142++ 
OCGT 
advanced 
464 550 16.5 11 65 964 n/a 














363 2890 63.3 3.5 75 5957 n/a 
Anaerobic 
digestion 












1308 1010 39.4 4 50 5957 n/a 
Hydropower 
run-of-river 
230 5500 82.5 5 0 2978  0* 
Hydropower 
dam and 








712 6080 182.4 6.9 0 5957  0§§ 
*Albrecht and Laleman, 2014; **European Wind Energy Association, 2005; +Elia, 2016a; ++International Energy 
Agency, 2001; +++ Joint Research Centre, 2014 ; § We assume zero expansion due to nuclear phase-out; §§ we assume 














∑ ,    
(in MW) 
Total profit 




	∑ ,   (in 
GWh) 
Electricity 





γ=1 8264 3654 105 041 29.39 
γ=0.75 8635 3643 107 158 28.98 
γ=0.5 9005 3626 109 275 28.57 
γ=0.25 9376 3601 111 392 28.16 





γ=1 1429 1291 73 298  35.54 
γ=0.75 1583 1293 73 643 35.47 
γ=0.5 1728 1296 73 966 35.41 
γ=0.25 1803 1296 74 132 35.38 





Table 4: Results of the different quadratic investment cost scenarios for each technology 
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Figure 2: Expansion in capacity (in MW) in function of the level of probability of nuclear 











Figure 4: Expanded installed capacity per technology in absence (left-hand side) and in case 
(right-hand side) of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes 
 
